
Bild 1



This talk is based on my book *The History of the Modern University*, which was published in Swedish earlier this year. Its subtitle summarized my main thesis: The universities moved from having been institutions for humanistic reflection to having become instruments of social-scientific governance.

Bild 2



Traditionally people think of universities as a free sphere where knowledge is pursued for its own sake, by independent scholars. However, when taking a realistic view, you quickly discover that the university is not a free sphere, but both an object and a tool for control and governance, as well as the cornerstone of the technocratic expert society we live in today.

Let us emanate from actual policy documents like Research Bills and state reports, describing what Swedish universities are actually instructed to do.
There you can easily see that modern universities are not supposed to seek knowledge for finding the truth, but to solve predetermined problems, generate innovations and such to form the future in a prescribed direction.

The following quote is from the Swedish state inquiry into the governance and funding of higher education, published in 2019 under the former chancellor of the university of Gothenburg, Pam Fredman

- State inquiries are not just reports. In Sweden a commission of inquiry is the constitutional instrument by which policy is prepared: experts are appointed, they investigate, they propose, and legislation follows from what they write. When I quote one, I am quoting the machinery, not a commentary on it.

“A simple way of describing the division of roles is that politics is to take responsibility for the what-questions, while the higher education institutions take responsibility for the how-questions. Government and parliament should thus set the overarching goals for the activity, while the institutions should have great freedom as regards how the goals are reached.”

This is not offered as a controversial position. It is offered as a simple way of describing something obvious. Politics owns the *what*. We own the *how*. Our freedom is the freedom of the implementer of what politics ask for.

The modern university is not threatened by governance. It was created for governance.

Bild 3

What is it that is governed into being?
The ideology supported by the modern university

- A positive view of innovation.
- A belief in research and education as tools for positive social development.
- The conviction that industrial growth is a collective interest.
- And an ambition of consensus and cooperation across class lines.

- Collectivist
- Capitalist and growth-oriented
- Pacifying class conflict and other conflicts of interest,
- Concealing the existing order and its uneven distribution of power.

If the goals are set elsewhere, it is worth asking what they are. I would summarize that ideology in four points:
A positive view of innovation.
A belief in research and education as tools for positive social development.
The conviction that industrial growth is a collective interest.
And an ambition of consensus and cooperation across class lines.
It is difficult to object to any of them. That is their strength. Because the package claims to be rational, and presents itself as uniting all parties in society, it looks like a politically neutral common interest.
It is not. It is collectivist, capitalist and growth-oriented. It pacifies class conflict and conceals other conflicts of interest, and for all its democratic vocabulary it tends to confirm the existing order and its uneven distribution of power.

Bild 4

How did the modern university take shape?




The social question as a societal challenge

It began with the so called "social question" – which is a term that was introduced in the nineteenth century to describe a problem: industrialisation had produced a working class,


and nobody in authority knew what to do about it. The working class was organizing to fight against their exploitation. They organized strikes and unions which was perceived as a danger by the industrial and economic elite that also had emerged with industrialization.

Bild 5



Pullman strike 1894 - That elite did not ask: what do these people want? But: how do we handle the working class?
That is a management question. It presupposes someone outside the class who does the handling, and that the handling can be done well or badly — which is to say, that it can be studied and controlled. The moment the question is framed that way, there is a job opening for a new kind of expert. The Swedish case illustrates how these experts were formed.

Bild 6



Gustav Cassel became professor of economics at Stockholms högskola in 1904, the first holder of that chair.

- Stockholms högskola, where most of what I will tell you happened, was not a state university. It was a private college, sustained by donors, and did not become Stockholm University until 1960. Before that Sweden had two state universities: Uppsala and Lund. That distinction is important — money could enter in Stockholm that was rejected as an attempt to influence by the traditional universities.

- In the 1920s Cassel was probably the most famous economist alive. Lloyd George, then Prime Minister of the UK, called him one of the most brilliant economists in the world; The economist Joseph Schumpeter, called him the most influential leader of our science. Cassel wrote the monetary memoranda for the Brussels conference of 1920 and for the League of Nations, and lectured constantly in Germany and England. And in May 1928 he was presented, to applause, to the United States House of Representatives as "the world's foremost economist".

Cassel was against political ideologies — liberalism and socialism alike — and for what he called “a scientific social policy”. Social policy was scientific when it followed the principle of “welfare through industrial development”. In practice he reclassified the conflict between labour and capital: no longer a conflict to be fought out politically,

but a problem to be handled ‘‘rationally’’ in line with his vision. And that is what trade union leaders should learn.


Cassel was one of the first in Sweden to say plainly that the labour movement should be trained rather than argued with. In 1902:

‘‘The trade union leader has a difficult and responsible position to fill, a position which in fact demands a quite particular education. We must reach the point where we make trade union politics the object of real study and of systematic instruction.’’

I will soon come back to Cassel as he also functioned as a mediator between the Rockefeller Foundation and Swedish scientists. It would be easy to file this cooperation as a story of American influence arriving in a small European country. That is not what the record shows.


The traffic ran both ways from the beginning. Sweden was not a recipient but a co-producer of the new, rational world order — which makes ‘‘the Swedish model’’ relevant for anyone who wants to understand modernity. It stuck me again when I listened to Jacob Nordangårds talk that Sweden seems to have played an astonishing central role as a pioneer, driving force and model nation for a worldwide development. Why that has been the case could be a question for our discussion and also for further examination.

Bild 7



This is Gösta Bagge who was one of Cassels successful students. Bagge was born in 1882 into a wealthy family, who's fortune came partly from investments in AB Separator, later Alfa Laval. The money secured his economy for life.
Like Cassel, Bagge was gripped by the social question, and in 1902 he went to the settlement movement: to Toynbee Hall in London, where young graduates lived among the poor of the East End and where the information they gathered was analysed by the London School of Economics.
He also moved in the dense little world of organisations working with the "scientific" solution of the social question, often financed by Swedish philanthropists inspired by the settlement movement: the Swedish Association of Students and Workers founded in 1886, *Social Tidskrift* from 1901, and the Central Association for Social Work, CSA founded in 1903. Today we would call CSA a think tank.

Bild 8



Bagge is said to have been the first Swede to study economics at an American university, and the only one of his generation.
He visited Hull House in Chicago — Jane Addams's settlement, and the meeting place of the American progressive elite — and then spent the year at Johns Hopkins. The historian Benny Carlson describes the ambition at these universities as the establishment of a *science of philanthropy*. Students were educated to systematically collect information from the workers and their unions during the summermonth, that than was analysed in university seminars and

student thesis during the winter. Both in Chicago and Baltimore the philanthropists like Hopkins and the Rockefellers financed this research, to optimize their charity: to increase both workers' welfare and loyalty — and such the productivity and sustainability of the philanthropes' buisnesses.

Bild 9



So far I have shown you a young man with money and an American education. That is not yet enough to found a discipline. During the 1910s Bagge imported the ideas he got in the US and developed them further with Swedish unions as his empirical material.

Together with Eli Heckscher he futher founded, and run for many years, *Svensk Tidskrift*, which became the leading conservative journal in the country.


In 1917 he took his doctorate under Cassel, with a study on "The regulation of wages through collective bargaining"

From 1918 he was a member of the Stockholm City Council.

By 1919, Gösta Bagge had a media platform, a reputation and a seat in the City Council.

His next aim was: a professorship in Social Policy from which he could develop his solution to the social question as "the scientific method".

Bild 10



In 1919 Gerhard Halfred von Koch — founder of Central Association for Social Work CSA, editor of *Social Tidskrift* and a liberal member of parliament — started to lobby for two chairs in social policy to be established, one at each of Sweden's two universities: Lund and Uppsala - in order to secure "real theoretical expertise in the field of social policy". The attempt failed. Partly because of the professors at the universities were against it. For example Carl Georg Björling, professor of civil law at Lund, explained:

"Another circumstance deserves in my view particular attention, namely that social policy is no more suited than any other branch of politics to serve as the subject of a university chair. Social policy is rather a guiding principle for action, an art, than a form of knowledge."

But also in the parliament people were against Von Kochs initiative: To the most outspoken critics belonged the Social Democrats Artur Engberg and Per Edvin Sköld.


The resistance came from the old universities and from the labour movement's own representatives — from both of the parties this science was later said to serve.

Bild 11



What could it cost to install a professor in Stockholm and to buy him an own institute?
120.000 kr!
Bagge and von Koch stated a fund raising campaign and in 1921 Central Association for Social Work CSA, together with Stockholm business, paid 120,000 kronor for what they wanted: a professorship and the Institute for Social Policy and Municipal Education and Research — the Social Institute. Bagge became its director.
This was not sinister and not unusual: if you had an idea and found sponsors, you could create a research field at a private college. But notice: Parliament had considered the von Kochs proposal and declined it. The universities had considered it and declined it. And then it happened anyway.
We usually call this the founding of Swedish empirical social science. It is equally accurate to call it a policy that was rejected democratically and implemented commercially.


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One. A political conflict is redescribed as a technical problem. Not *whose interests should prevail*, but *how is this best handled*.
Two. The existing university declines to host the new expertise, on the grounds that it is not a science.
Three. A private funder builds it outside the university — in an institute, a college, a foundation — where nobody has standing to refuse.
Four. The state adopts what has been built and makes it compulsory, at which point it stops looking like anybody's project and starts looking like the natural order of things.

Many disciplines tought at modern universitites have a version of that history.


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There was one difficulty. There was no demand for the empirical social sciences when they were implemented. Sweden was not ready for research based social work yet. This was not a Swedish peculiarity, and Cassel had said so twenty years earlier, writing about the London School of Economics:
‘‘The most difficult task for the school was to attract students. Neither the country's examination system nor the requirements set for entry into the various professions offered students sufficient motive to complete a serious course in the subjects in which the school offered instruction. The demand for such an education had for the most part to be created.’’
The demand had to be created. Not met — created.
And the instrument was the education itself. You cannot make people want a science they do not need, but you can arrange things so that they need it: attach the subject to entry requirements, to examinations, to who counts as qualified for a post. Every graduate then becomes an ambassador who can attest to the need for more graduates.
Another prominent example for how that works is of course teacher

education, which turns on the difference between the qualified and the unqualified teacher, and excludes potentially good, but independently educated teachers from the profession.
Bagges Institute for Social Policy and Research was close to be closed in 1924. Doe to lack of students and money.


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The Swedish demand problem was solved from outside.
Beardsley Ruml was twenty-seven in 1922 when he became director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, and was charged with spending twenty million dollars within ten years on the global establishment of the social sciences — about seventy-five million Swedish kronor, or thirty-seven times the yearly budget of both Swedish state universities at that time.
His plan was not secret. It is on the slide, in his own words:
“The development of social science requires that there should be in the world a dozen, fifteen, twenty, well-founded and effective research institutions.”
A dozen, fifteen, twenty. In the world. He is not funding research; he is founding a discipline.
The grants were not applied for in open competition. They were distributed by agents who travelled around universities compiling catalogues of candidates. According to a note in the Rockefeller archive, the most important method for identifying young talent was — I quote — travel, spies, meetings and just hanging around.


In 1924, with his institute's finances at their darkest, Bagge went to America.

Bild 15



We know what happened because Cassel wrote it down in his memoirs in 1941:
"On Sunday 24 May 1925 Bagge was at lunch with me, together with a couple of representatives of the Rockefeller Institute. We discussed on that occasion the plan for a large Swedish socio-economic investigation. The result was the donation of Rockefeller funds which Stockholms högskola subsequently received, and which provided the material basis for the considerable investigations that Bagge and Myrdal, together with a number of younger economists, carried out at the college's Social Science Institute."
The passage is valuable precisely because it is so untroubled. Cassel is not confessing; he is remembering, with evident satisfaction, a good afternoon's work.
But consider what he describes. The research programme of a national discipline is settled at a private lunch between a professor, a party politician and two representatives of an American foundation. No faculty. No board. No competition. And no parlamentary decision either.

Bild 16



Between 1926 and 1938 the Rockefeller Foundation financed empirical social science at Stockholms högskola to the tune of roughly 280,000 dollars — about one million Swedish kronor, which was the equivalent of the entire annual budget of Lund University in 1924–25. I am not going to claim that money determines results. What money determines is which questions get infrastructure, which researchers get careers, and which alternatives quietly fail to exist. That is a slower mechanism than corruption, and a far more effective one.


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These are some of the people that money produced. Gunnar Myrdal. Erik Lindahl, professor of economics at Uppsala. Erik Lundberg, who advised the finance minister alongside his political opponent Myrdal. Karin Kock, minister of supply and Sweden's first woman professor of economics. Dag Hammarskjöld, 2nd Secretary General of the United Nations.
These people represented different political parties and organisations, but what united them was an ambition: a research-based social

policy with continuous growth as its engine and the raising of general prosperity — one might say, of the general capacity to consume — as its principal goal. It sought to shape society systematically in accordance with the visions of large-scale industry, in opposition not least to the socialist alternatives and to a range of traditional norms and values.

Bild 18



Between 1925 and 1960 the Rockefeller Foundation supported forty handpicked Swedish economists and sociologists. More than half — twenty-five of forty — became professors in Sweden.
In 1967 Swedish higher education had sixty-one professors in the social science subjects all told. Roughly one third of them came out of Rockefeller's cadre.
One third of a country's social science professoriate, from one foreign donor's list. I do not think anyone involved experienced this as a takeover. They were doing what struck them as obviously useful work.
Historians of the social sciences have long argued about how much causal weight the American foundations should carry: Donald Fisher held that they were decisive, Martin Bulmer that the disciplines were developing anyway and the foundations merely accelerated them.
The Swedish evidence settles that for Sweden, for the reason I gave a few slides ago: here we can see what the country chose when it was choosing without the money, and what it chose afterwards.

Bild 19



After he had established and strengthened his Institute for Social Sciences Bagge became leader of the Conservative Party in 1935 and minister of schools, universities and churches from 1939 to 1944. In that office his social policy research became public policy.

Two state inquiries from 1944 matter. One secured and expanded the higher social-policy education he had built. The other proposed the establishment of a social science research council.


That is the decisive institutional step, and it is step four of the pattern. A research council is a mechanism for deciding, centrally and in advance, which questions are worth answering. Before research councils, a Swedish scholar with an idea looked for a patron, a post, or nothing. After their introduction, Swedish scholars look for a call.

What Bagge did was not to free science. It was to install permanently, at state level, the arrangement he had spent twenty years assembling privately and in exchange with his donator, the Rockefeller Foundation. The policy that changed the character of the university was imported from abroad. The world's first research council was formed in America in 1916, with Rockefeller and Carnegie money, to steer research towards projects expected to benefit American social development. In 1923 the Rockefeller Foundation set up the first research council for the social sciences — with Beardsley Ruml as its head.

Twenty years later the same idea became Swedish law.

One of the researchers whos research was funded by the new research council is Torsten Husén.

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
Husén took his doctorate in pedagogy at Lund in 1944. From 1950 to 1954 he taught at Bagge's Social Institute. In 1953 he became professor of pedagogy and educational psychology at Stockholms högskola.

He is the most internationally influential social scientists Sweden has produced. He is also where my story stops being about who financed a discipline and starts being about what the discipline was for.

The social scientific vision was summarized by Husén and his student Urban Dahllöf with diagram in a Swedish government inquiry in 1970. I am showing it to you now so that you know where we are going and will come back to it in more detail later. Its caption reads: *educational planning and education policy as a link in total social planning*. ….


How did that become a thinkable diagram? For that we have to go back to the war…

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
Before he became a professor in education and before he was recruited as a fellow of the Ford Foundation, Husén was an expert in military psychology.
German was the foreign language Husén knew best and that is how he came to read the German literature on propaganda, and to summarize it in articles for the Swedish military.
A central author, for him, was General Erich Ludendorff, whose *Der totale Krieg* appeared in 1935. Modern war, he wrote, is total because it is fought on three fronts: where the weapons meet, where they are forged, and where the will to defend has its roots. It is the third that gives the weapons their edge.
Hence the first sentence on the slide: "Only the total state is capable of mastering total war."
And he is specific about what that requires:

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
The state must already in peacetime have the unified moral, political and economic structure that equips it to withstand modern war in all its totality. – And to become competitive and resilient, which of course is not to the detriment in peacetime either (and goals modern societies strive for still today).
A state that becomes total only when the shooting starts has left it too late; the structure has to exist in advance, which means the work of building it is not military work. It is educational, administrative and cultural work, done in peacetime, by civilians.
Or as Husén expressed the logic in 1942:

Bild 23



‘‘Instead of totalising the state as a consequence of the exertions that total war demands, it lies close at hand to make it total in order to master a coming war.’’
Do it in advance. Do it voluntarily. Do it in an orderly fashion, before anyone forces you.


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Husén had also discovered, in the same literature, which argument works best. Concerning WWI he wrote:
‘‘In general the strongest emphasis was placed on the democratic ideals for which England and the USA said they were fighting against militaristic, Junker-ruled Germany. "Make the world safe for democracy" was the slogan that secured the Entente the sympathies of almost every civilised country. The war thereby came to appear above all as a vast ideological reckoning, which pushed the power-political motives almost entirely into the background.’’
Which pushed the power-political motives almost entirely into the background. That is offered as praise.

It describes a mechanism that worked.
Democracy is the most efficient mobilising word available, precisely because everyone wants it — and, as he notes, it works even when the war is about something else.
Democracy appears here not as something to be defended but as an instrument for making people willing to sacrifice.
It is easy to recognize the same rhetorics in action still today, in order to form compliant citizens, ready to subordinate to elite projects, my it be war or other goals pointed out by the elites.


Bild 25



It is easy to expect that a professor of education would defend education and enlightenment and the authority and independence of adults. That is not how Husén reasoned in the 1940s, but the opposite:
‘‘Faith in one's own ideals and the certainty of the rightness of one's own cause are more important than an abstract knowledge of "objective" conditions, which is of use only to the experts and the leaders, who have to take the measures the situation requires. The broad mass can sometimes be little helped by it, since, when the country is in imminent danger, it does not have sufficient insight to draw the correct conclusions independently.’’
There are two populations in this passage. The experts and the leaders, who take measures and therefore need to know how things actually are. And the broad mass, which needs to believe.
This is an important passage, not because it is shocking; a great deal of


twentieth-century social science rests on some version of it. It matters because it specifies the relationship between knowledge and the public that the modern university went on to institutionalise: research produces knowledge *for* decision-makers *about* a population that is not expected to draw its own conclusions.

Bild 26



The war ended. The programme continued. This is from a Swedish state inquiry on psychological defence, published in 1953, with Torsten Husén as an expert:
"In order for a country's defence to be able to meet the strains of a total war with any prospect of success, it must be designed as a total defence, in which the whole of society is strained in a common will to defend. … Here, as with preparedness in general, the broad planning must be carried out already in peacetime."
And then, the staffing:
"It lies in the nature of the matter that for this study of the spirit of resistance and of the conditions for psychological warfare, scientifically trained experts are engaged, primarily social psychologists, sociologists, political scientists and statisticians, but also historians, cultural anthropologists and psychiatrists."
That is a list of university disciplines — not as an object of study, but as staff. The peacetime task of continuously surveying the mood of the population, and of testing what moves it, is assigned to the faculties.

Bild 27




By 1968 the framework no longer needs a war. Proposing what he called a coordinating body for system solutions, made up of selected social scientists, Husén explained where the model came from:

‘‘Up to now it is only the military that has had coordinating bodies of this type at the central level. The Defence Staff is not primarily an executive agency but a body for the "long" thinking, directed at strategic and tactical problems. We would need a coordinating body in the fields of human care and social planning as well.’’

A defence staff for human care. Husén offered this analogy without embarrassment, because by 1968 it hade become normalized.

Notice also what such a body does to politics. It moves responsibility for society's problems from parliament, where ideological positions negotiate over what to do, to research, which presents sustainable solutions. Once that move is made, disagreement is no longer a political position, but an expression of so called research denial or desinformation.


Bild 28



SOU 1970:22, Pedagogiskt utbildning och forskning. Utbildningsdepartementet

Which is how we arrive back here, at the diagram from 1970.
Now read the picture properly. At the top, overarching goals. At the bottom, social planning. Between them, the boxes through which planning reaches the goals: working life, the housing environment, the home, the school with its subsystems, universities and colleges, mass media, social institutions, and the courts.
And the university is one box in that row. Not the place from which society is observed. One of nine instruments through which society is adjusted.
This is not my interpretation of Swedish education policy. It is Swedish education policy's own diagram of itself — printed by a government inquiry and occasioning, as far as I can establish, no scandal whatsoever.
Compare it with the 2019 formulation I began with: politics takes the what-questions, the institutions the how-questions. Fifty years apart, and the same architecture. What has changed is the vocabulary — from planning to governance, from goals to quality assurance, from system solutions to strategic initiatives.


Bild 29



Husén did not stay in Sweden, and the rest of his career shows where this project was actually run from.
Already in 1952 – when still working for the Swedish army as an expert of psyological warfare and before he became a professor of education - he was invited to Frankfurt as European specialist at the College for international pedagogical research — founded by the American occupation authority to professionalise German teachers through a social-scientifically oriented teacher education. Which is to say: to replace humanistic *Bildung* with an empirical social science promising planned development.
At that workshop he was recruited by the UNESCO for its new Institute for Education in Hamburg, helping to build the world's first large-scale international evaluation of schools and pupil performance. Its stated purpose was to reform the schools of the Western world. It was financed by the foundations of big industry and by the American government.
Four years later the Swedish state secretary set up a new Institute of Education in Stockholm in a way that recalled the Frankfurt college – in order to reform Swedish teacher education with the social sciences as a base — and note what these institutes had in common. Neither was a university. Both were new institutions erected beside the existing universities, because a new field is easiest to found where nobody has standing to refuse it. That is step three of my pattern, and it is the same step as Bagge's Social Institute, thirty-five years earlier. The Institute in Stockholm prepared the radical schoolreforms that followed in the 1960s.
In 1961 the school comparisons left UNESCO for a free-standing institute

of their own, the IEA, with Husén as chairman.
In the 1960s he was invited to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences by Ford Foundation several times.
And in 1969 the IEA's database — the information on the school systems of the entire world — moved from Hamburg to Stockholm.
How that happened is documented in an letter I found in the National Archives in Stockholm. In June 1969 Husén wrote to the Swedish university chancellor, to explains that he had, at the Ford Foundation's request, applied for two million kronor to start an institute for international education in Stockholm. Ford wanted high-level training of evaluators. Ford attached great importance to the institute being attached in some way to a Swedish university. Ford wanted it in black and white that there was interest on the part of the Swedish authorities. The detailed plan had been drawn up in consultation with Ford's vice-president. That the chair would go to Husén was assumed by both parties. The university said yes, and created the department and the chair.
And here is the mechanism: Once the operation sat inside a university it acquired scientific status, and criticism of it stopped being criticism of UNESCO, of the OECD or of an American foundation, and became criticism of academic freedom and of independent science. The foundations called this kind of money seed money. A cuckoo's egg would be the better term: the host ends up spending an ever larger share of its own resources raising somebody else's project, at the expense of truth seeking by independent researchers.

Bild 30



Let me come back to the subtitle of my book and draw its halves together. Humanistic reflection assumes that a person studies in order to understand the world and eventually to take positions of her own, and that society is carried by citizens who ground their decisions in independent judgement and take responsibility for them, whatever those decisions may be. Its object is the person doing the studying.

Social-scientific governance assumes that society is a complex system in which people figure as components, and that the goal for each component is not to think freely about the system but to help it function better — more efficient, more equal, more sustainable — with the help of expertise. Its object is the system.

Most people outside Sweden arrive with a particular story about this country: a social democratic welfare state, built from below by a strong labour movement, admirable or naive according to taste. Almost every element of what I have described cuts against that story. The man who rebuilt the university was the leader of the Conservative Party. The decisive money was American and private. The proposal to make social policy a science was opposed in parliament by Social Democrats. And the minister who defended studying for its own sake, against the demand that education be useful, was a Social Democrat too.

Whatever this was, it was not socialism, and it was not built from below. It was a technocratic project that both blocs came to share as the scientific answer to the social question.

Thank you.